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We compare the behavior of car mechanics and college students as sellers in 
experimental credence goods markets. Finding largely similar behavior, we note much 
more overtreatment by car mechanics, probably due to decision heuristics they learned 
in their professional training. 
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1  Introduction 
Goods and services where an expert seller (he) knows more about the quality of a 
good a consumer needs than the consumer (she) herself are called credence goods. 
Although consumers can ex post observe the utility derived from the good, they do not 
know whether the received quality is the ex ante needed one. Consumers might even be 
unable to observe the received quality. Typical credence goods include car repairs, 
medical services, or software programming.  2 
The informational asymmetries prevalent in credence goods markets can lead to 
several types of inefficiencies: (1) undertreatment, i.e. the provided quality is 
insufficient to satisfy the customer's need; (2) overtreatment, i.e. the provided quality is 
higher than needed; and (3) overcharging, i.e. the expert charges for a higher quality 
than provided. In a recent experimental study, Dulleck, Kerschbamer and Sutter (2009) 
(hereafter DKS) have examined the influence of different institutional/informational and 
market conditions on behavior on experimental credence goods markets. While they 
have run their experiment with college students, we use real car mechanics as expert 
sellers in order to explore whether the provision and charging behavior of real 
practitioners in credence goods markets differs from that of college students. By doing 
so, we contribute to the issue of external validity of results produced in laboratory 
experiments. 
In previous years there has been considerable interest in running experiments with 
subject pools drawn from the field (rather than from a college) in order to make reliable 
inferences about behavior in the field. For example, Fehr and List (2004) show that 
CEOs trust more and are more trustworthy than students. Alevy et al. (2007) find that 
market professionals from the Chicago Board of Trade are better able to discern the 
quality of public signals than student subjects. However, Haigh and List (2005) report 
that the same professionals are even more prone to the effects of myopic loss aversion 
(see Gneezy and Potters, 1997). 
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple model of a 
credence goods market. Section 3 presents the experimental procedure and Section 4 the 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2  The Credence Goods Model 
Consider the following credence goods game (hereafter condition B), which is a 
simplified and parameterized version of a game studied by Dulleck and Kerschbamer 
(2006). There are two players, an expert seller and a customer. First, the expert posts 
two prices: P
L for a low quality service and P
H for a high quality service, where P
L, P
H 
{1,2, …,11} and P
L ≤ P
H. The customer gets to know these prices and then decides 
whether to stay out of the market or to interact with the expert. If the customer stays out, 
the game ends and both parties receive an outside option of 1.6 points. If the customer 
decides to interact with the expert, nature determines with equal probability the need for 
the low or the high quality service. The expert learns the customer’s need and provides 3 
either the low (q
L) or the high (q
H) quality, where the low (high) quality has costs of cL 
= 2 (cH = 6) points. Finally, the expert charges one of the posted prices: P
L if he claims 
to have provided the low quality and P
H otherwise. The customer receives a value of 10 
points from the interaction if she receives a sufficient quality (i.e., if she needs the low 
quality and gets either the low or the high quality, or if she needs the high quality and 
gets it), otherwise she receives a value of zero. Whether or not the customer’s need is 
satisfied, she must pay the price of the quality the expert claims to have provided. 
Figure 1 illustrates the sequence of moves in this game and the payoffs of each player. 
In real credence goods markets various informational and institutional conditions 
might limit experts' fraudulent behavior. We consider two limitations on experts' 
strategy spaces (in comparison to condition B): liability (condition L), requiring that the 
expert provides a sufficient quality, and verifiability (condition V), requiring that the 
expert charges the price for the quality of service rendered. Thus, liability precludes 
undertreatment, and verifiability precludes overcharging. Note that liability does not 
preclude overcharging, whereas verifiability does not prohibit undertreatment. Neither 




Figure 1: Game Tree 
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Assuming common knowledge that all players are rational and only interested in 
own material payoffs the three games can be solved via backward-induction: (i) In 
condition B, the expert always provides the low quality and charges for the high one. 
Anticipating this, the customer only enters if P
H ≤ 3. But with such a P
H no expert is 
able to earn the value of his outside option. Thus, the market breaks down. (ii) In 
condition  L, the  expert always provides the appropriate quality and charges P
H. 
Anticipating this the consumer accepts if P
H ≤ 8. Thus, the expert posts P
H=8 (P
L is 
irrelevant) and the customer enters the market. (iii) In condition V, the expert always 
chooses (and charges for) the quality with the higher mark-up defined as the difference 
between price and cost. Since consumers correctly anticipate this, the expert cannot gain 
by cheating. Thus, the expert posts the most profitable equal mark-up vector that is 
accepted - which is the vector (P
L,P
H) = (6,10) - and the customer enters the market. 
 
3  Experimental Procedure 
We recruited car mechanic apprentices in their third or fourth year of professional 
training from the “Tiroler Fachberufsschule für Kraftfahrzeugtechnik”, a vocational 
school located in Innsbruck, Austria. These apprentices work as regular employees at 
their respective auto repair shops and we use them as experts in our experiment. 
Students at the University of Innsbruck acted as customers. In total, 96 car mechanics 
and 96 undergraduate students participated in the computerized experiment 
(Fischbacher, 2007). Each session had 16 rounds. Four car mechanics and four students 
formed one independent matching group, with random re-matching of one car mechanic 
and one student after each round. The exchange rate between points and euros was 0.25 
euro per point, and participants earned about 13 euros in less than 90 minutes. 
DKS ran an experiment with the same procedure, but with a standard subject pool 
consisting of 280 college students. By comparing the results of the respective market 
conditions between DKS and our experiment, we are able to identify the effects of a 
change in subject pool and assess the external validity of their experimental results. 
 
4  Experimental Results 
In the following analysis we present data for rounds 7-16 in order to focus on 
experienced behavior of participants. Note that all results stay qualitatively the same 
when all periods are included. 5 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all experimental conditions, where B, L 
and V indicate the three institutional conditions introduced above and subscript C or S 
refers to car mechanics or students, respectively, in the role of sellers. Interaction is 
calculated as the proportion of cases where customers agree to interact. Efficiency is 
calculated as the ratio of the actual average profit per period less the outside option and 
the maximum possible average profit per period less the outside option. Undertreatment 
(overtreatment) is calculated as the relative frequency with which the expert provides 
the low (high) quality when the customer needs the high (low) one. In order to make 
overcharging comparable between conditions B and L, we define overcharging as 
satisfying the following conditions: (i) P
H > P
L, (ii) the customer needs the low quality, 
and (iii) the expert provides the low quality, but charges for the high one. Profits refer to 
averages per period, measured in points. 
 
 
Experts are:  Car Mechanics  Students 
  BC  LC  VC  BS  LS  VS 
Interaction  0.45  0.68  0.48  0.39  0.82  0.45 
Efficiency  0.09  0.64*  0.22  0.16  0.88  0.14 
Undertreatment  0.68 ‐   0.49  0.58 ‐   0.63 
Overtreatment  0.11*  0.07*  0.20**  0.04  0.00  0.01 
Overcharging  0.78  0.69 ‐   0.90  0.79 ‐  
Profits of Experts  2.40  2.66*  2.13  2.55  3.60  2.45 
Profits Customers  1.04  2.34  1.68  1.09  2.06  1.13 
Number of Subjects  64  64  64  96  96  88 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
(**/*) difference to experiment with other subject pool significant at the 1% / 5% level 
(two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test) 
 
Result 1. Regardless of whether experts are car mechanics or students, (i) 
markets under condition B perform better than standard theory predicts, (ii) markets 
under condition V perform worse than standard theory predicts, and (iii) imposing L 
has a large and significant effect on interaction rates and efficiency, while imposing V 
does not. 
Support: (i) The interaction ratio is 0.45 in BC, respectively 0.39 in BS which 
refutes the theoretical prediction of no interaction. In part, this is a consequence of 
experts’ behavior (actual undertreatment and overcharging ratios are significantly below 
the predicted level of 100% which increases incentives for customers to enter the 
market), in part consumers are responsible (they are too credulous as they enter the 
market although it does not pay to do so).  6 
(ii) and (iii) The benchmark solution suggests that both liability and verifiability 
should increase interaction rates up to 100%. However, only liability, but not 
verifiability, significantly increases the interaction rate in comparison to condition B, 
controlling for the subject pool. The insignificant effect of verifiability on interaction – 
compared to condition B – is driven by two factors. (a) The prediction for V is based on 
expert sellers posting equal mark-up vectors. Such vectors are very rarely chosen in VC 
(10%) and in Vs (2%), though. (b) The benchmark solution assumes that experts provide 
the appropriate quality under equal mark-up price vectors. However, experts frequently 
over- or undertreat even under such vectors.  
While there is no significant subject pool effect in undertreatment and 
overcharging ratios in the different institutional conditions, we find strong differences 
between the behavior of students and car mechanics with respect to overtreatment in all 
of them: 
Result 2. Car mechanics provide overtreatment much more often than student 
experts. 
Support: In all 3 institutional conditions, car mechanics provide the high quality 
when the low one is needed significantly more often than students. Notice that under 
conditions B and L, overtreatment causes unnecessary costs for the expert while the 
customer does not benefit. Thus, from an economic point of view overtreatment is pure 
waste. Also, in condition V and under undertreatment price vectors (i.e., P
L – 2 > P
H – 6) 
– where experts should provide the low quality to maximize their profit – we find 
significantly higher overtreatment ratios among car mechanics than among students in 
each single condition. 
Car mechanics’ professional trainings, routines, and norms could induce them to 
use decision heuristics different from those of students. In the current experiment, car 
mechanics are introduced to the new, unfamiliar environment of an economic 
experiment. When facing such an environment it seems natural that car mechanics rely 
on decision heuristics for similar situations experienced in the field. In this sense, the 
tendency of car mechanics to overtreat seems to be consistent with the incentives they 
face in everyday life. In the car repairing business undertreatment often implies serious 
consequences or is simply not possible, either due to institutional constraints or the car 
mechanic’s concern about his reputation. Overtreatment, on the other hand, is difficult 
to detect and punish. Combined with the fact that in real life a diagnosis is typically 7 
subject to errors, this yields strong overtreatment incentives.
1 In the lab subjects seem to 
take quite some time to learn that diagnosis is perfect and that undertreatment has no 
immediate consequence for them. Figure 2 provides the development of the 
overtreatment ratio over the last 10 periods in all six conditions. Overtreatment ratios of 
car mechanics start much higher and remain much higher – despite falling over time – 
than those of student sellers. 
 
 
Figure 2: Overtreatment Over Time 
 
5  Conclusion 
Our results show that most findings regarding behavior on experimental credence 
goods markets are robust to a change in the subject pool. However, when comparing the 
provision behavior of car mechanics with that of a standard subject pool, we find that 
car mechanics have a strong propensity to provide unnecessary repairs. Since in the car 
repairing business – as in many other credence goods markets – overtreatment is hardly 
detectable and profitable, this behavior reveals patterns consistent with the incentives 
car mechanics face in their everyday professional life. 
 
                                                 
1 This might explain why overtreatment is a core problem in car repair. For instance, Wolinsky 
(1993) refers to a survey conducted by the US Department of Transportation, estimating that more than 
half of car repairs are unnecessary.  
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